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THE IMPENETRABLE CONSTITUTION AND
STATUS QUO MORALITY
Charles A. Kelbley"
INTRODUCTION
Professor George has presented an unconventional and provocative
position on natural law and judicial review that raises a number of
important questions about his natural law philosophy.' His response
to Professor Fleming's commentary 2 raises still more troubling
questions about the nature and extent of his commitment to the
American legal tradition that is founded on a belief in natural law and
the protection of natural rights.3 In particular, his view of the role of
judicial review in that tradition seems largely to negate two centuries
of well-established practice under our Constitution. In this article I
discuss some of the problems I find with George's positions as set
forth in this colloquium.
My discussion has three parts. The first concerns George's criticism
of Justice William 0. Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut.4  Unlike George, who repeatedly criticizes Justice
Douglas's use of the phrase "penumbras formed by emanations" in
explaining the source of the right of privacy,5 I find much to be said
for that very language. I also think there is much more in Justice
Douglas's opinion, and in the separate concurring opinions in
Griswold, that can and does support the constitutional basis of the
right of privacy. The second part of my discussion will focus on
George's reliance on, and his agreement with, Justice Hugo Black's
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University: Adjunct Associate
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Jim
Fleming for instructive comments on an earlier draft of this article and for helpful
discussion with him and Ben Zipursky. This article is my Response to Professor
Robert P. George, The Natural Law Due Process Philosophy, 69 Fordham L Rev.
2301 (2001).
1. Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the Theory and Practice
of Judicial Review, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2269 (2001).
2. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Natural Law and Natural Rights in Constitutional
Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2285 (2001).
3. Robert P. George, The Natural Law Due Process Philosophy, 69 Fordham L
Rev. 2301 (2001).
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. See, e.g., George, supra note 3, at 2303-04.
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dissenting opinion in Griswold.6 Justice Black castigates the Douglas
majority opinion for its holding that the right of privacy is implied by
several of the amendments to the Constitution.7 Black also criticizes
the separate opinions of Justices White, Harlan, and Goldberg for
engaging in what Black thought was a "natural law due process"
methodology to justify the recognition of the right of privacy.8 In light
of Justice Black's positivism, skepticism, and opposition to natural law
and natural rights tout court, he is hardly an authority to rely upon to
support George's thesis that under our Constitution the legislatures,
not the courts, have the primary authority to give effect to natural law
and to protect natural rights.9
In the third part I focus on George's related embrace of Robert
Bork's legal positivism,"0 which he evidently thinks is also consistent
with legislative enactments of natural law. I argue that Bork is a
radical skeptic and therefore an equally strange candidate for alliance
with the promotion of natural law and natural rights. Following the
lead of Justice Black and Bork, George appears to embrace a narrow
legal positivism and literalism. That embrace does not lead to a clear,
intelligible Constitution, as they claim, but to an impenetrable,
opaque Constitution that stems from the virtual rejection of any
meaningful and substantive sense of judicial interpretation of the
moral content of the Constitution. In effect, George leaves the
elaboration of natural law requirements primarily to legislative
majorities, which of course tend to reflect popular opinion and status
quo morality. How George can manage to distill natural law out of
these fallible, and often prejudiced and discriminatory sources, is left
wholly undeveloped. His move is also quite contrary to the historical
mission of such key constitutional provisions as the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, which were
enacted in great part to embody abstract moral principles to guard
against abuses engendered by status quo morality."
I. IN DEFENSE OF GRISWOLD
George's strategy in criticizing Justice Douglas's majority opinion in
Griswold is to characterize it as ludicrous because he thinks Douglas
6. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 509-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 510-27 (Black, J., dissenting).
9. George, supra note 1, at 2282.
10. George, supra note 3, at 2302.
11. For a discussion and criticism of certain Supreme Court decisions which relied
upon the related idea of "status quo neutrality," see Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial
Constitution 41 (1993) (stating that with the idea of status quo neutrality the Court
took "existing practice as the baseline for deciding issues of neutrality and
partisanship... by assuming that existing practice was prepolitical and natural-that
is, that it was not itself a function of law, or subject to challenge from the standpoint
of justice").
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was engaging in "free wheeling judicial review"' 2 and drawing upon
the "metaphysics of 'penumbras formed by emanations."'' In fact,
Justice Douglas's use of penumbra was an allusion "to an old and, to
Douglas, familiar constitutional law concept of the implied powers of
the federal government,"' 4 powers that are based on the Necessary
and Proper Clause. 5 Indeed, it is notable that the penumbra doctrine
"permits one implied power to be engrafted on another implied
power." 6  As Professor Dorothy Glancy observes, "[the idea of
implied limitations on government powers was not Douglas's
invention. Thomas Cooley's A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations
argues extensively for them and even discusses an implied right of
privacy."' 7 Although he was not as inclined as Justice Douglas to
engage in or support penumbral thinking without qualifications,
Justice Holmes did use "penumbra" in a number of cases." Indeed, in
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 9 he stated that "the law allows a penumbra
to be embraced that goes beyond the outline of its object in order that
the object may be secured. 21' That was, of course, precisely the point
Douglas was making within the particular circumstances of the
Griswold case.2'
Justice Holmes's use of penumbra is also captured by the "'spirit of
the law"-as in the familiar distinction between the "letter and the
spirit of the law"-which is very commonplace and not at all spooky,
least of all to natural lawyers. Far from engaging in "free wheeling
judicial review"' or "metaphysics," ' it would be more accurate to say
that Douglas was simply relying in great part on common sense. ' It is
12. George, supra note 3. at 2305.
13. George, supra note 1, at 2270 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484): see also
George, supra note 3, at 2310.
14. Dorothy J. Glancy, Douglas's Right of Privacy: A Response to His Critics, in
"He Shall Not Pass This Way Again": The Legacy of Justice William 0. Douglas 155.
162 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990).
15. U.S. Const. art. I. § 8.
16. Black's Law Dictionary 1022 (5th ed. 1979): see Glancy, supra note 14, at 162.
174 n.45.
17. Glancy, supra note 14. at 174 n.46 (citation omitted).
18. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438. 469 (1928) (Holmes. J.,
dissenting): Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf. 240 U.S. 403.426 (1916) (Holmes, J..
concurring).
19. 270 U.S. 230,241 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
20. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, at 482-83 (1965) ("Without those
peripheral [penumbral or implied] rights the specific rights [set forth in the Bill of
Rights] would be less secure.").
22. George, supra note 3. at 2305.
23. George, supra note 1. at 2270; George, supra note 3. at 2310.
24. Even H.L.A. Hart, the most prominent proponent of a sophisticated version
of legal positivism in the twentieth century. had much to say about the uses of
"penumbral thinking" in the law. He stated that:
We may call the problems which arise outside the hard core of standard
instances or settled meaning "problems of the penumbra"; they are always
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a common sense notion of the letter and spirit of the law-both with
respect to particular provisions and the entire Constitution. As
Justice Douglas said in his Poe dissent, "[t]his notion of privacy is not
drawn from the blue. It emanates from the totality of the
constitutional scheme under which we live."
Quite apart from sophisticated constitutional interpretation and the
careful and reasoned analysis of precedents that characterized Justice
Douglas's opinion for the Court in Griswold, it seems almost a matter
of common sense, against the background of our constitutional
scheme of government, that if I have a right of free speech I also have
the implied or peripheral or penumbral right to speak privately. If
not, my alleged right of free speech is meaningless, threatened, or, at
the very least, "less secure." If I have a Fifth Amendment right not to
incriminate myself, I may very well argue that I have an implied or
peripheral or penumbral right to remain silent. If not, my right
against self-incrimination is illusory or, at the very least, "less secure."
Analogously, if a married woman has a right to have sexual relations,
she may sensibly conclude that she has an implied or peripheral or
penumbral right to her private decision to have sexual relations
without risking pregnancy at that particular by using some form of
contraception. If not, her responsible exercise of sexual freedom is
significantly attenuated by the state's virtual oversight of "the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms." 6 It is little wonder, then, that all nine
justices in Griswold thought the Connecticut statute was a bad law.
As George recognizes,2 7 even the two dissenters, Justices Black and
Stewart, found the Connecticut anti-use statute "offensive" or
"uncommonly silly. '28 Yet George defends it.
with us whether in relation to such trivial things as the regulation of the use
of the public park or in relation to the multidimensional generalities of a
constitution. If a penumbra of uncertainty must surround all legal rules,
then their application to specific cases in the penumbral area cannot be a
matter of logical deduction, and so deductive reasoning, which for
generations has been cherished as the very perfection of human reasoning,
cannot serve as a model for what judges, or indeed anyone, should do in
bringing particular cases under general rules. In this area men cannot live by
deduction alone. And it follows that if legal arguments and legal decisions
of penumbral questions are to be rational, their rationality must lie in
something other than a logical relation to premises.
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593,
607-08 (1958).
25. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
26. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
27. George, supra note 1, at 2274.
28. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I feel constrained to add
that the [Connecticut anti-use] law is every bit as offensive to me as it is to my
Brethren of the majority and my Brothers Harlan, White and Goldberg who, reciting
reasons why it is offensive to them, hold it unconstitutional."); id. at 527 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("I think this is an uncommonly silly law.... As a philosophical matter, I
believe the use of contraceptives in the relationship of marriage should be left to
[Vol. 70
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George is absolutely correct, however, in saying that many
constitutignal scholars have criticized Justice Douglas's use of the idea
of "penumbras formed by emanations.- 29 Even Professor Laurence
Tribe, who otherwise defends Griswold, referred to its "twilight zone
talk of 'penumbras... formed by emanations... .'" Yet, as I have
suggested, underneath Douglas's language there is a good deal of
common sense. The same is true of Justice Harlan's opinion in
Griswold,3 where he declined to join Justice Douglas's opinion for the
Court because Douglas's approach was too wedded to the particular
texts of the Constitution." Instead, Harlan thought Douglas should
have relied on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. His
reasons were expressed in his famous dissent in Poe v. Ullman,1 -
where the Court, over Justice Harlan's dissent, refused to reach the
merits of the identical issues that were to be raised again four years
later in Griswold.
"Due process," Harlan wrote,
has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code.... If the supplying of content
to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational
process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to
roam where unguided speculation might take them:U
Justice Harlan's emphasis on "rational process" is echoed in what
Joseph Koterski said in his response to George, that "natural law
arguments depend on careful reasoning and bringing reasonable
people to see the compelling nature of the arguments offered."''
Harlan's long dissent in Poe was an admirable attempt to do just that.
Here I might note in passing that it is striking that George should, in
his criticism of Griswold, concentrate on Justice Douglas's majority
opinion and ignore both Justice Harlan's concurrence in Griswold and
his famous Poe dissent, which was a vital part of the thinking that led
to the right of privacy. Instead of devoting so much energy to
ridiculing "penumbras formed by emanations," George might have
personal and private choice, based upon each individual's moral, ethical, and religious
beliefs.").
29. See generally Glancy, supra note 14.
30. 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 43 (3d ed. 2000) (omission
in original). But see James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy. 48 Stan. L
Rev. 1, 38 n.215 (1995) ("I do not concede that there is anything spooky or scary
about penumbras and emanations ....").
31. 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
32. Tribe, supra note 30, at 43 n.25 ("It is sometimes forgotten that Justice Harlan
disagreed with the majority opinion in Griswold because he thought that Justice
Douglas's approach was too restrictive!").
33. 367 U.S. 497,522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., Response to Robert P. George, Natural Law, The
Constitution, and The Theory and Practice of Judicial Review, 69 Fordham L Rev.
2297,2297 (2001).
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better defended his critique of the right of privacy by responding to
Harlan's defense of substantive due process. After all, substantive
due process is the beast that George wants to slay, not the particular
linguistic phrase that Douglas used to defend the right of privacy on
other, non-substantive due process grounds.
6
Unlike George, who seems to focus on the words and phrase§ of the
Constitution to the exclusion of Justice Harlan's "rational process,"
Harlan emphasized many other things that go into dtle process. He
argued that the imperative character of a constitutional provision
must be discerned from a particular provision's larger context. And
inasmuch as this context is one not of words, but of history and
purposes, the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This
"liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the
taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the
right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints, and which also recognizes,
what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests
require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to
justify their abridgement.37
Justice Harlan's approach to due process in his Poe dissent
influenced later Court decisions, particularly the Casey joint opinion,8
and was at the core of Justice Souter's long and careful review in
Washington v. Glucksberg of "two centuries of American
constitutional practice in recognizing unenumerated, substantive
limits on governmental action."39 Souter noted that even though "this
practice has neither rested on any single textual basis nor expressed a
consistent theory," the very "persistence of substantive due process in
our cases points to the legitimacy of the modern justification for such
judicial review."4 Commenting on Justice Harlan's Poe dissent and
Justice Souter's Glucksberg concurrence, Professor Tribe observed:
In essence, Harlan and Souter were suggesting that the
Constitution's structure (as well as its history)-the way it was put
together-reveal that the gaps between the rights-defining
36. Justice Harlan's confidence in the possibility of reason and reasoning evinces
what Levinson has called a "catholic" approach to constitutional interpretation, as
contrasted with a "protestant" approach (which is illustrated by Justice Black's
jurisprudence). See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 18-53 (1988). This
contributes to the irony, noted by Fleming, of George embracing Justices Black and
Iredell instead of Justices Harlan and Chase. See Fleming, supra note 2, at 2290.
37. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
38. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
39. 521 U.S. 702, 756 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
40. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
262 [Vol. 70
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provisions enumerated in the Bill of Rights are only apparent and
do not represent substantively empty space but instead serve to
juxtapose, in an almost Impressionist fashion, individual
commitments in combinations also showing additional guarantees.
Stripped of its twilight zone talk of "penumbras... formed by
emanations," Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut, it becomes apparent, simplifies and intensifies, but
remains of a piece with, Harlan's analysis-almost frantically
accumulating individual provisions of the Bill of Rights and their
Supreme Court glosses so that, brought together, the), frame the
now apparent constitutional right of privacy. It is difficult to
disagree with Harlan, Souter, and Douglas. To see the matter
otherwise is to see government power everywhere except in those
finite and isolated recesses where the rights of individuals have been
expressly recognized. And that in turn is to assume a structure in
which government has all power unless specifically told otherwise, a
structure as alien to the logic of limited government as its
counterpart on the federal-state stage would be alien to the logic of
limited national power.4'
The point I wish to make is that Griswold is defensible from a
number of perspectives, only a few of which I have briefly outlined
above. But in light of those perspectives, George's single-minded
emphasis on the language of "penumbras" and "emanations" is little
more than caricature, hardly a fair-minded or historically informed
analysis. Even if Justice Douglas's opinion were in fact a veiled
example of substantive due process (which Douglas emphatically
denied),42 that long-standing practice can certainly lay claim to
legitimacy, as Justice Harlan's Poe dissent, 3 the Case*, joint opinion,"
and Justice Souter's Glucksberg concurrence arguably demonstrate in
great detail.4 5 Yet that very practice is at the heart of George's attack
on Griswold, and leading his attack is Justice Black's dissenting
opinion in Griswold, where Justice Black's principal weapon is the
supposedly deadly epithet of "natural law due process philosophy." Is
that epithet potent enough, however, to overcome the "reasoned
judgments" of Justices Harlan and Souter?46
41. Tribe, supra note 30, at 43 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). For an
excellent discussion of how one might construct the structure of "deliberative
autonomy" from a list of familiar "unenumerated" fundamental rights that have been
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, see Fleming, supra note 30, at 7-14.
42. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,481-8 (1965).
43. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
45. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752 (1997) (Souter. J.. concurring in
the judgment).
46. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (stating that "'adjudication of substantive due
process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise
that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned
judgment"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165. 171 (1952) ("To believe that this
judicial exercise of judgment could be avoided by freezing 'due process of law' at
2001]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
II. JUSTICE BLACK'S ATTACK ON NATURAL LAW
Before dealing with George's use of Justice Black's Griswold
dissent, I want to comment on one aspect of the interchange between
George and Fleming. I do so not to enter into their disagreements but
to show that my initial reaction to George's original paper4 7 was quite
similar to that of Fleming's response to George.4" Fleming read
George's paper as "embracing Justice Black's legal positivist harangue
against natural law in dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut."49 Fleming
was astounded to see a defender of natural law, such as George, align
himself with Justice Black. So was I. However, in his response to
Fleming," George scolds Fleming for failing to "attend carefully to
the different meanings assigned to [natural law and legal positivism]
by different writers or by a given writer in different contexts."'-
George believes that the "anomaly [Fleming] thinks he finds in
[George's] analysis is an illusion generated by his failure to observe
that the 'natural law due process philosophy' that Black rejects has no
necessary connection to the 'natural law' [George] affirm[s]."52 But as
I read George's original piece,53 there is no discernible difference
between George and Justice Black; George's embrace of Black seems
complete, absent any effort on George's part "to attend carefully" to
how his understanding of natural law differs from Black's.
On balance, Fleming's is the more careful reading of Justice Black
inasmuch as George advances a highly unconventional interpretation
of Black without acknowledging the burden of refuting the
conventional interpretation (expressed by Fleming) much less
carrying it. Indeed, it is only in his response to Fleming that George
tries to give some indication of what he means by natural law. He
does so by referring to, but not providing, an argument by John Finnis
that purports to show that "[t]here are human goods that can be
secured only through the institutions of human law, and requirements
of practical reasonableness that only those institutions can satisfy."'"
That short proposition is the only substantive indication we have
from either of George's two papers of what he means by natural law.
It is that proposition, he says, that he defends against "moral skeptics"
and "relativists."55  I think, however, that any number of legal
some fixed stage of time or thought is to suggest that the most important aspect of
constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate machines and not for
judges....")
47. George, supra note 1.
48. Fleming, supra note 2.
49. Id. at 2285-86.
50. George, supra note 3.
51. Id. at 2301.
52. Id. at 2301-02.
53. George, supra note 1.
54. George, supra note 3, at 2302 (alterations in original) (quotations omitted).
55. Id.
[Vol. 70
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philosophers, of different jurisprudential persuasions, could, without
more, easily embrace that proposition. Indeed, I believe Justice
Black, notwithstanding his skepticism, would fully agree that the
United States Constitution and the majority of state and federal laws
have been uniquely secured through the practical reason of judicial
and legislative institutions. So where is the difference between Black
and George? Both oppose the judiciary's resort to natural law, by
which they mean judicial reasoning that is, in their views, unsupported
by the text of the Constitution. Of course, Justice Black's opposition
to natural law is based on his view that judges who rely on natural law
reasoning are simply basing their decisions on their subjective values
and preferences. Although George professes ignorance about
whether Black was a metaethical skeptic, it seems abundantly clear
that he was. For example, Hadley Arkes, George's fellow proponent
of reviving natural law in constitutional theory, noted that according
to Justice Black:
[T]he vice of substantive due process was connected, inescapably, to
the vice of taking natural rights seriously. Natural rights he
regarded, as Jeremy Bentham had regarded it before him, as a
species of "nonsense on stilts." [Black] ... was deeply skeptical
about any claim to know objective moral truths; he was convinced
that all of these claims were simply reducible in the end to the
personal beliefs, or the personal "values," of the judges. They could
not be proven true or false; they were irreducibly matters of the
most subjective belief or private taste. Therefore, they could not
supply a standard, hovering above the laws or contained in the
Constitution; a standard to which judges could appeal in measuring
the legislation passed by politicians.5 6
Black's skepticism-ethical and metaethical-could hardly be more
complete. If Black is a skeptic, however, not just about judges' ability
to know objective truth, but about the very possibility of such
knowledge, why does George rely so heavily on Justice Black's
critique of substantive due process? Certainly if one were interested,
56. Hadley Arkes, The Return of George Sutherland: Restoring a Jurisprudence
of Natural Rights 27 (1994) (emphasis added). Justice Black was
the most implacable opponent of natural law. And on that point, there was
never a shade of doubt: behind substantive due process, there had to be
some notion of natural law or natural right -some claim to have access to an
objective truth, perhaps a truth grounded in nature, or a truth grounded in
the law of reason. But whatever the source from which it sprung, it would be
a truth that did not depend on the votes of a majority. For after all, if all
truth were conventional, then the only measure of truth would be found in
the votes of majorities. And in that case, the function of the judge could
only be as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes described it: to assure that the
herd gets its way-that the majority be allowed to prevail in some decorous
manner, with the trappings of legality.
Hadley Arkes, Lochner v. New York and the Cast of Our Laws, in Great Cases in
Constitutional Law 94,96 (Robert P. George ed., 2000).
2001]
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as George surely claims he is, in knowing whether judges are
competent to explicate the explicit and implicit moral content of
natural law and natural rights contained in the Constitution, one
would avoid at all costs consulting a moral and epistemological
skeptic, such as Black. Perhaps George himself is a skeptic, or maybe,
as Fleming thinks, his position "reflects political judgments about
what institutions are most likely to realize his particular conservative
conception of natural law."57 Since similar questions are raised by his
apparent, if partial, alliance with Robert Bork's jurisprudence, I will
defer my answer to those questions and first give my assessment of
Bork's place within George's thinking.
III. BORK'S SKEPTICISM: LEGAL AND MORAL
George finds Robert Bork's legal positivism at least somewhat
compatible with his own views. Indeed, Fleming refers to George's
evident "attempt to wed natural law with Borkean legal positivism."5
For example, George asserts that Bork is not the kind of legal
positivist, such as George finds in Hans Kelsen, who rejects "the
objectivity of human goods and moral requirements."59 Instead, he
says that Bork's legal positivism "is expressly restricted to the claim
that under our Constitution courts are entitled to enforce only the
positive law of the Constitution and are obligated to defer to
legislative judgments where the positive law does not forbid legislative
action."' So it would seem that George views Bork and Justice Black
in a similar way. If we are to believe George, their devotion to legal
positivism simply springs from pure reverence for the law and their
justified hatred of "heretics" who depart from the orthodoxy of what
the law is.6' But as we saw above, Black's positivism springs not from
disinterested reverence for law but from deep skepticism; for Black,
law seems to be something we must acquiesce in, faute de mieux. But
is Bork any different? Isn't he too a skeptic? George apparently does
not think so.62 I do not believe, however, one can sensibly deny that
he is. Consider Bork's views, that I quote at length below, on the
possibility of moral reason in the law, and then ask yourself whether
Bork is or is not a moral skeptic and whether, like Justice Black, he
too rejects "the objectivity of human goods and moral requirements ' 61
that are so central to George's own understanding of natural law.
57. Fleming, supra note 2, at 2286 n.10.
58. See James E. Fleming, A Further Comment on Robert P. George's "Natural
Law," 70 Fordham L. Rev. 255, 255 (2001).
59. George, supra note 3, at 2302.
60. Id.
61. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law 6-11 (1990) (arguing that departures from the "'ratifiers' original understanding
of what the Constitution means" constitutes the "heresy" of "political judging").
62. George, supra note 1, at 2280 n.46.
63. George, supra note 3, at 2302.
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As the following citations to Bork's work demonstrate, he rejects
the relevance of moral reasoning to the law upon two related grounds.
One is fairly superficial; the mere fact that all people do not agree on
such matters. The second links this diversity of opinion to the claim
that, absent universal agreement, there can be no proof of the truth of
any moral proposition. That is, from the fact that people disagree on
moral matters he draws the conclusion that no one position can be
right, for if it were it would convince all reasonable persons and
disagreements would vanish. Bork's repeated insistence on this
remarkable proposition is worth reproducing, at the price of some
repetition:
[T]he idea that the public, or even judges as a group, can be
persuaded to agree on a moral philosophy necessarily rests upon a
belief that not only is there a single correct moral theory but, in
today's circumstances, all people of good will and moderate
intelligence must accept that theory. None of these things is
possible. 64
If the basic institution of our Republic, representative democracy, is
to be replaced by the rule of a judicial oligarchy, then, at the very
least, we must be persuaded that there is available to the oligarchy a
systematic moral philosophy with which we cannot honestly
disagree.65
The supposition that we might all agree to a single moral system...
[is] so unrealistic as not to be worth discussion. 6'
[One] reason to doubt that moral philosophy can ever arrive at a
universally accepted system is simply that it never has. Or, at least,
philosophers have never agreed on one. 7
If the greatest minds of our culture have not succeeded in devising a
moral system to which all intellectually honest persons must
subscribe, it seems doubtful, to say the least, that some law professor
will make the breakthrough any time soon. It is my firm intention to
give up reading this literature. 68
In short, like Justice Black, Bork certainly embraces skepticism-
moral, interpretive, and, I would suggest, legal skepticism. For if we
cannot penetrate into the moral and normative meanings of the law,
particularly key phrases of the Constitution's Bill of Rights, what we
are left with are words and names that have no underlying reality;
they point to nothing beyond the boundaries of their limited semantic
content. Perhaps this "nominalism" was exemplified by Justice
64. Bork, supra note 61, at 252.
65. Id. at 253.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 254.
68. Id at 255.
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Black's well-known First Amendment absolutism, which he expressed
in his belief that the Amendment's words "'Congress shall make no
law' [simply] means Congress shall make no law."69  It is also
exemplified, however, by Bork's narrow originalism and his
constriction of the morality of law to the positive morality of framers
and ratifiers who are the unique Makers of the law for us, the passive
Receivers. The practical effect of that semantic approach to
constitutional meaning is to encourage a "plain fact" view of law that
seems largely to deny the ongoing process of seeking the "integrity in
law" that is arguably one of its cardinal properties.7" It does not allow
us to view the Constitution as adumbrating a set of substantive
principles that we can build upon as we extend the Constitution into
the future."' Its time-preference is decidedly for the past, which
ignores the claim that the Constitution is a never finished affair that is
necessarily elaborated over time-past, present, and future.72
I believe that Bork's brand of skepticism, like Justice Black's, is
captured by what Ronald Dworkin has called "external" skepticism in
contrast to "internal" skepticism.73 Let me explain the distinction.
The internal skeptic is a participant in some enterprise, such as the
interpretation of art, literature, morality, or a social practice like law.
Such a skeptic may doubt a given interpretation of a text or practice;
she may even deny that there is or can be any unified and acceptable
interpretation of a given novel, play, social practice, or law. In that
case her skepticism, as Dworkin says, is "global." But it is important
to recognize that her skepticism, partial or global, arises in and
through her exercise of a commitment to an interpretive endeavor-
her active participation in and concerted effort to render the "right"
interpretation of a play, practice, or the provisions of a document such
as the U.S. Constitution. Her skepticism is a result of embracing,
rather than rejecting, an active interpretive attitude. If her skepticism
is "global" with respect to law, it must be taken quite seriously. But
first we will want to examine her arguments.
The external skeptic is quite different. Her skepticism is external
because she stands outside the interpretive enterprise. She is
disengaged because she is paralyzed by a metaphysical view that
demands, as Bork does, universal agreement as the touchstone of
acceptable moral reason. Since that criterion will never be met, we
must simply accept the morality of law that has been ingrained in it by
69. Hugo LaFayette Black, A Constitutional Faith 45 (1969).
70. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
71. See generally James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72
Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993) (constructing a substantive political theory that best fits and
justifies our constitutional document and underlying constitutional order).
72. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional
Self-Government (2001).
73. See Dworkin, supra note 70, at 76-85 (distinguishing between external and
internal forms of skepticism about interpretation).
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past lawmakers. Departures from that morality constitute "heresy"
and involve "moral relativism." Bork himself, of course, is a critic of
moral relativism, but it is important to see that what he means by that
term is largely any departure from the positive morality that is
entrenched in a community's law at a particular moment in time.7 As
an example of "extreme moral relativism" he cites various positions
advocated by the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") on
homosexuality, gambling, pornography, and other issues that oppose
the status quo morality entrenched in the law.'- But whatever the
merits of specific issues within ACLU advocacy, Bork seems to
condemn them merely because they differ from the status quo
morality of law. In this respect, he exhibits the marks of the external
skeptic, disengaged from the enterprise of interpretation and reasoned
argument. If Bork thinks the ACLU's positions are mistakes, poor
performances within the enterprise of interpretive practices in the law,
he needs to match the ACLU's reasons and arguments for their
positions with contrary reasons and arguments of his own.76 Labels
alone convince no one who takes morality and legal rights seriously.
I emphasize Bork's skepticism and his endorsement of status quo
positive morality because George, too, has tendencies in this
direction. Like Bork, he thinks that "judges will generally come to
share elite views [another label] where salient divisions develop
between elite and popular opinion."' And he thinks that "today elite
opinion tends to be on the liberal side of moral and cultural issues.""
He wonders whether "anyone doubt[s] that a poll of the Princeton or
Fordham faculty on 'partial birth abortion' or 'same-sex marriage' will
produce results rather different from a poll of the first seven hundred
names in the Trenton or Pelham telephone book."79 While that is not
an unqualified endorsement of popular, status quo moral views, it
does seem to express a distinct preference for those views over "elite"
views expressed in and through judicial reason, and that raises the
specter of either skepticism or politics. If George is a skeptic along
the lines of Justice Black and Bork, we can understand his embrace of
the positive morality located between the covers of telephone books."
But if George is playing politics, in the sense of making a political
judgment about which group or institution is most likely to endorse
his conservative moral and legal views about natural law, that is quite
74. Bork, supra note 61, at 241-50.
75. Id at 243-44.
76. See Dworkin, supra note 70, at 83. In referring to Bork's criticism of ACLU
positions, I do not mean to defend any particular positions of the ACLU but simply to
note the need for interpretation and argument in opposing them.
77. George, supra note 3, at 2307.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Again, there is irony in the fact that George, a persistent proponent of
reviving natural law, would come across as such a positivist and even a skeptic.
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another matter. In either case, we seem to lose contact with the
historical understanding of natural law as a set of normative ideals of
the Constitution and enforced through the reasoned judgment of
judicial review.
CONCLUSION
I conclude with a synthetic account of George's position as I
understand it. George is skeptical of the current practice of judicial
review because it has, from his perspective, so often led to liberal
results-results which he thinks cannot be right, either because of his
extra-legal value judgments and/or contrary philosophical
commitments. To avoid liberal court decisions, which he thinks are
now in vogue, George proposes to strip the Constitution of its abstract
moral provisions, for they are simply open invitations to what he
views as free wheeling judicial review. Of course, that more or less
drains from the Constitution the normative and aspirational ideals of
natural law and natural rights. To avoid that particular criticism,
George proposes that wherever Courts apply the Constitution in a
straightforward and literal manner, they are enforcing natural law and
natural rights. That way he can have his cake and eat it too: He still
honors, at least nominally, our natural law heritage but avoids the
liberal results that that heritage, on his view, has so often endorsed.
And to further ensure that natural law beyond the Constitution
continues to flourish, he will entrust its elaboration primarily to the
legislative branches of government. Just what natural law legislation
will look like is not at all clear. But I suspect that it will largely consist
in affirming status quo morality, or in what Justice Holmes described
as letting the herd get its way. 81 At the present moment, George is
apparently confident that the people's representatives will not
endorse such liberal causes as same-sex marriage and partial birth
abortion (based on his estimate of the positive moral views of
ordinary citizens). One has to imagine that it is also his hope to see
the reversal of many liberal decisions that are now part of our law.
With the help of allies such as Bork, Justice Black, and Justice Scalia,
he may think that the reversal of Griswold privacy may one day be
accomplished. But first George needs to slay the dragon that is
substantive due process, which is the source of so many of the liberal
results that stem from what he views as free wheeling judicial review.
Finally, is George a skeptic, along the lines of Justice Black and
Bork, or does his position reflect, as Fleming thinks, "political
judgments about what institutions are most likely to realize his
particular conservative conception of natural law"?' I think the
answer is a little of both, which results in not a little incoherence in
81. See supra note 56.
82. Fleming, supra note 2, at 2286 n.10.
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George's views. If George were a skeptic to the core, his commitment
to defending natural law would be illusory, even hypocritical. Yet his
embrace of Black and Bork points in that very direction. For if not
for their radical skepticism about "reasoned judgment," Black and
Bork would not be legal positivists. To embrace their legal positivism
therefore entails embracing their skepticism. George will, of course,
deny that he is a skeptic, despite the fact that his limited view of
judicial reason is, as I have suggested, so alien to the natural law
tradition that he otherwise defends. On the other hand, it may be that
whatever skepticism we can attribute to George is pure posturing,
deriving from his political judgment that the legislative branches of
government will better realize his view on what the natural law
requires. However, skepticism, real or feigned, about judicial reason,
but not about legislative reason, has its price. For what Fleming said
in criticism of Corwin may well extend to George's putting so much of
the natural law's elaboration into the hands of legislators, whose
political survival is so often dependent upon voting their constituents'
status quo morality into law. I refer to Fleming's observation that
the course of human history, including that of American history....
is strewn with both atrocities committed against, and appalling
neglect for, basic human rights, dignity, and needs. And so, we
should be skeptical about any theory that treats our historical
practices or laws themselves as the repository of natural law or
natural rights.&;
83. Id. at 2291.
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